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THE COURT OP APPEALS, 1954 TERM
driving home from a high school after a basketball game in which his school had
participated. He was arrested and convicted of operating a motor vehicle under a
junior operator's license "other than going to and from school, during the hour of
darkness (without being) accompanied by a duly licensed operator who is over
eighteen years of age."2 9 The defendant contended that at the time of arrest he was
coming "from school." He felt the word "school" as used in the statutory exception
included extra-curricular activities as well as formal school sessions. The Court, in
affirming the conviction, held that "the exception as to going to and from school
was added to allow a junior operator to drive an automobile during the hours of
darkness, if his journey was to or from school sessions. .. It would be quite an
extension of that idea to hold that such junior operator could, unaccompanied,
drive, at any hour of the night, so long as he was returning from a school function."
The dissent is grounded on the general rule that penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused"0 and "to say that the term 'school' means
only a regular session of school' is to construe this statute strictly against the
defendant for such a conclusion can be reached only by ignoring the numerous
broader meanings which the word 'school' admittedly has."
Public WYelfare Offenses
In People v. D. H. Ahrend Co.31 the Court was called upon to interpret the
phrase "knowingly permit,"32 as applied to the president of a corporation's failing
to comply with the provision of the Labor Law33 relating to prompt payment of
wages. The majority held that the defendant was actively engaged in corporate
affairs, and thus knowingly34 failed to prevent the non-payment of wages; nothing
more was required to establish his guilt. The dissent would have required proof
that defendant had knowledge that the employees were not going to be paid when
he permitted them to work for the corporation; since the evidence showed that
defendant could not possibly have known this, they felt he should have been
exculpated.
The rationale of the majority was predicated upon the difficulty of proving
29. N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAV, §§20, subd. 1, par. b; 70, subd. 1.
30. People v. Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90, 94, 46 N. E. 1040, 1041 (1897).

31. 308 N. Y. 112, 123 N. E. 2d 799 (1954).
32. ". . . the officers of any such corporation who knowingly permit the
corporation to . . . (fail) to pay the wages of any of its employees ... are guilty
of a misdemeanor .. ." N. Y. PENAL LAW §1272.
33. "Every . . . (employer) shall pay weekly to each employee the wages
earned to a day not more than six days prior to the date of such payment."
N. Y. LABOR LAW §196 (2).
34. "The term 'knowingly' imports a knowledge that the facts exist which
constitute the act or omission a crime, and does not require knowledge of the
unlawfullness of the act or omission." N. Y. PENAL LAW §3(4).
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knowledge of all the facts in this type of public welfare offense, and hence they
believed that such a requirement would emasculate the statute. The dissent recoiled
at imposing criminal sanctions when the defendant's act was free of criminal intent.
Conviction for crime without mens rea has become solidly entrenched in New
York Law, 35 as it has throughout the United States.3 0 The complexity of present
society and the need for enforcement of minor violations of such statutes as the
liquor, pure food, sanitary, building, and factory laws and the like has called for
obviation of the requirement of mens rea. As long as this innovation does not
gain a foothold3 7 in the enforcement of traditional types of criminality, it does
not seem particularly dangerous.
Use of Phototraffic Camera
In People v. Hildebrant38 defendant was convicted of a "traffic infraction" 30
driving an automobile at an illegal speed in a restricted zone. 40 The device employed to ascertain the rate of speed of defendant's car was a "phototraffic camera,"
which takes two pictures at a given interval. The driver was not arrested or indentified at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, nor was any direct proof
as to who was in fact operating the car offered at the trial. The defendant appealed
from an adverse ruling of the County Court 4 ' directly to the Court of Appeals by
permission of an associate judge; the Court reversed, holding that mere proof of
ownership of a vehicle will not support an inference or presumption of an identity
between the registered owner and the person who was operating the vehicle at the
time of the traffic infraction.
Although it may be conceded that a "traffic infraction" falls outside the purview of "criminal law," it has been classified as "quasi-criminal" in that such cases
are tried as misdemeanors, 42 requiring the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 4 3 Under certain conditions, speeding offenses constitute a misdemeanor; 44
35. People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farm Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 121 N. E. 474
(1918) (employment of child under 14); Ward v. O'Connell, 280 App. Dlv. 1021, 116
N. Y. S. 2d 785 (3d Dep't 1952) sale of liquor to minors).
36. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REV. 55 (1933).
37. Some cases which indicate that this foothold has been gained are State
v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 215 Pac. 41 (1923); State v. Quinn, 131 La. 490, 59 So.
913 (1912); United States v. Balint, 258 U. S.250 (1922); State v. Hennessy, 114
Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211 (1921).
38. 308 N. Y. 397, 126 N. E. 2d 377 (1955).
39.

N. Y. VamcLE & TRAFFIC LAW §2(29).

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. §§56(4), 95(c).
204 Misc. 1116, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 48 (1954).
Supra, note 39.
People v. Erickson, 283 N. Y. 210, 28 N. E. 2d 381 (1940); People v.

Strong, 294 N. Y. 930, 63 N. E. 2d 119 (1945).
44. See N. Y. PUBLic AUTHORITY LAw §361(1).

